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 Decision-makers in Texas have proposed an Education Savings Account (ESA) that 
would allow all families to take a fraction of their public education financing to a school of their 
choice.  If the ESA funding amount exceeds the school tuition level, families would be able to 
use these funds for other educational expenses such as tutoring, textbooks, educational therapy, 
online learning, and college costs.  While this is may be viewed as obvious benefits to individual 
children and their families, the impacts on society overall are less clear. 
 We estimate the impact of the proposed ESA on criminality from 2016 to 2035.  We use 
crime reduction estimates from our previous study of the impact of the longest-standing private 
school voucher program in the United States, along with existing estimates of the social costs of 
misdemeanors and felonies, in order to monetize and forecast impacts for the ESA in Texas.  We 
find that a universally-accessible ESA could have large benefits to the state of Texas through 
reduced crime over the first 20 years of the program.  Specifically, we estimate that the first 
cohort of high school students to experience four years of a universal ESA program in Texas 
would produce 749 fewer felonies and misdemeanors by the time they become 22 years old, 
resulting in about $7 million in benefits to society by 2025. The cumulative social benefits would 
amount to $74 million by the end of 2030 and $194 million by the end of 2035. 
 Keywords: education savings account, school choice, education reform, crime prevention, 









School choice takes various forms in the U.S. and abroad. Tuition-free public school 
choice options include charter schools, magnet schools and access to particular traditional public 
schools through residential choice. Private school choice options are available in over half the 
U.S. states and over a dozen countries through vouchers, tax-credit scholarships, individual tax 
credits/deductions and education savings accounts (ESAs). 
ESAs have been enacted in five states in the U.S.: Arizona in 2011, Florida in 2014, and 
Mississippi, Nevada, and Tennessee in 2015. Policy makers in Texas have proposed a universal 
ESA which would place all children’s public education funding into savings accounts to be used 
by parents solely for the child’s educational expenditures (Huffines and Colyandro, 2016; 
Grusendorf and Scherer, 2016). Approved uses of these funds include private school tuition and 
fees, online learning, tutoring services, and higher education expenses. By permitting parents to 
customize their child’s education, ESAs are expected to increase the educational outcomes of 
students. Since a better education enhances the social and citizenship skills of students, it could 
decrease their likelihood of committing crimes. Research finds that school choice programs such 
as these actually reduce the incidences of criminal behavior in young adults (DeAngelis and 
Wolf, 2016; Deming, 2011; Dills & Hernández-Julián, 2011). 
While the overall crime rate recently has dropped in Texas (McCullough, 2016), the state 
still hovers around the top 20 percent in the country in property crimes per capita and the top 30 
percent in violent crimes per capita (Compare 50).Texas’ average rank was 6th for property 
crimes per capita and 13th for violent crimes per capita during the period 2000 to 2014. 
In this study, we use results from existing research to estimate the impact of a universal 
ESA on criminal activity in Texas. Drawing upon our study of the crime reduction effects of the 
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Milwaukee Parental Choice Program (DeAngelis and Wolf, 2016), we forecast that a universal 
ESA in Texas could reduce the number of felonies and misdemeanors committed by the K-12 
students enrolled in the program in the first year by around 749 by the time they are 22-25 years 
old. This reduction in crime would decrease social costs by almost $7 million.1 These benefits 
would grow dramatically over the first five and ten years of the program. 
 
Background 
There is an abundance of research on school choice programs around the world. Most 
studies focus on how choice affects standardized test scores, high school graduation, and college 
enrollment. Shakeel, Anderson, and Wolf (2016) conducted a meta-analysis of the test score 
impacts of school voucher programs across the globe and found overall statistically significant 
positive results, especially after three or more years of the program.   
Only a few studies have examined the intersection between school choice programs and 
crime. David Deming (2011) compared the adult criminal activity of winners and losers of the 
2002 charter school admissions lottery in Charlotte-Mecklenburg County, North Carolina. He 
found a large reduction in criminal activity of about 50 percent for a high-risk group of male 
students if they gained access to charter schools. Dills and Hernández-Julián (2011) examined 
how parents’ ability to select their child’s public school by moving, generally called “residential 
school choice,” influenced criminal activity. They found that a moderately large increase in 
residential school choice was associated with a 40 percent decrease in juvenile crime. 
We evaluated the effects of the oldest urban school voucher program, the Milwaukee 
Parental Choice Program (MPCP), on crime (DeAngelis and Wolf, 2016). We took 1,089 MPCP 
students who were in either 8th or 9th grade in 2006 and matched them with 1,089 similar public 
                                                
1 All social cost estimates are in 2016 dollars. 
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school students. Each matched student was similar regarding grade, race, gender, English 
Language Learner status, baseline math and reading test scores, and neighborhood. The match on 
baseline test scores and neighborhood were especially important because students with similar 
achievement levels and who live in the same neighborhood tend to have similar propensities to 
commit crimes. Additionally, research has shown that this particular matching procedure is one 
of the best at replicating experimental results (Bifulco). We searched for each of the 2,178 
students in a comprehensive Wisconsin state database of criminal records when they were 
around 22-25 years old and found that participation in the MPCP throughout high school was 
associated with a 79 percent reduction in the likelihood that a given student would commit any 
felonies and a 66 percent reduction in the likelihood that a student would commit any 
misdemeanors.   
 
Data and Methods 
We use our estimates of the crime reduction impact of the MPCP to determine the 
potential effect of an ESA program on the criminal activity of Texas students. It is reasonable to 
draw upon the Milwaukee school choice program effects in this case because, even though ESAs 
allow parents to choose to use their child’s educational funds to purchase more than just private 
school tuition, most parents use ESAs to cover private school tuition, especially in the first years 
of such programs (Butcher and Burke, 2016).  
The forecasted social benefit of launching a universal ESA program in Texas in the fall 
of 2017 due to the program’s estimated crime reduction can be summarized as: 
Social Benefit = Public School Enrollment * Program Participation Rate * Consistent User Rate 
* Crime Reduction Rate * Average Cost of a Crime 
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Public School Enrollment is estimated for 2017-18 in Texas based on the U.S. Census Bureau’s 
Digest of Education Statistics, table 203.20, and the assumption that the school age population 
will increase by 1 percent each year. Program Participation Rate is set at 5 percent of all 
students in the first year of the program (2017-18), doubling to 10 percent the second year and 
growing by 1 percentage point each subsequent year, as happened when the DC Opportunity 
Scholarship program was launched in 2004-5 and also when the Milwaukee program was 
expanded to religious schools in 1998-99 (Wolf et al., 2008; Wolf, 2012). Consistent User Rate 
represents the proportion of ESA participants who will remain in the program for four 
consecutive years and is set at 44 percent based on the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program 
(DeAngelis and Wolf, 2016). We assume that students who participate in the program for less 
than the full four years of high school experience no reduction in their likelihood of committing 
crimes in the future—a very conservative assumption.   
Crime Reduction Rate is 3.44 percentage points (representing a 79 percent reduction) for 
felonies and 4.76 percentage points (representing a 66 percent reduction) for misdemeanors, 
again drawing upon the Milwaukee school choice crime reduction study (DeAngelis and Wolf, 
2016). Average Cost of a Crime is set conservatively as $20,000 for each prevented felony and 
$1,700 for each prevented misdemeanor (McCollister, French, & Fang, 2010; Levine and Siegel, 
2011). We estimate the social benefit of reductions in felonies and reductions in misdemeanors 
separately and then combine the two benefits into a total program social benefit. See the 






Out of the 5,399,800 students projected to enroll in public schools in the fall of 2017, we 
assume that 5 percent will participate in the ESA program and that 44 percent of the participants 
will persist in it over four years. In other words, 118,796 participating students will persist 
throughout the program. If we assume that these persisting students are equally distributed across 
all K-12 levels, about 9,138 of them would be in 9th grade in the baseline year of 2017. These 
will be the first students able to get a full four-year high school experience in the program. After 
the first four years of the program, we assume that 9,138 of these students will exit as adults. 
These same students would not become 22 years old until 2025. Since 2025 is the first year that 
the first set of full dose students could benefit from the program, it is our first year of realized 
results. 
Based on a 3.44 percentage point reduction in felonies committed, we estimate that 314 
fewer felonies will be committed by the students who have persisted through the program and 
become at least 22 years old by the year 2025.2 By 2030, we estimate that 3,283 fewer felonies 
will be committed by the persisting students who have exited the program and become at least 22 
years old. By 2035, we estimate that 8,682 fewer felonies will be committed by the students 
persisting through the program. These results, and their 95 percent confidence intervals, are 
presented in Figure 1.   
Due to the reduction of 314 felonies committed by the first cohort of students who persist 
in the program throughout high school, costs to society would decrease by about $6 million in 
2025. By 2030 and 2035, social costs avoided through the decrease in participant criminal 
activity would cumulate to $66 million and $174 million, respectively. These results, and their 
95 percent confidence intervals, can be found in Figure 2. 
                                                
2 We looked up criminal records when the students were between 22 and 25 years old (DeAngelis and Wolf), so we 
do not know exactly when the crimes were committed. Since students would have committed these crimes sometime 









Based on a 4.76 percentage point reduction in the number of misdemeanors committed by the 

























































number of misdemeanors will decrease by 435 by 2025. By 2030 and 2035, that number will 
cumulate to 4,542 and 12,014, respectively. These results, and their 95 percent confidence 
intervals, can be found in Figure 3. 
 
If we assume that a misdemeanor costs $1,700 to society, on average, a 6,126 reduction in the 
number of misd 
emeanors committed by the first cohort of students will result in a social cost savings of about $1 
million by 2025. By 2030 and 2035, this cost savings will grow to $8 million and $20 million, 
































Table 1: Projected Cumulative Social Benefits with ESA in Texas 
 
 2025 2030 2035 
Cumulative Persisting Participants 118,800 349,608 498,671 
Δ Felonies  314 3,283 8,682 
Social Benefits from Reduced Felonies (Millions) $6 $66 $174 
Δ Misdemeanors 435 4,542 12,014 
Social Benefits from Reduced Misdemeanors (Millions) $1 $8 $20 
Δ Felonies and Misdemeanors 749 7,825 20,696 










































All of the previously discussed results can be found in Table 1. The first cohort of high 
school students to experience four years of a Texas universal ESA program would produce 749 
fewer felonies and misdemeanors by the time they become 22 years old, resulting in about $7 
million in benefits to society by 2025. The cumulative social benefits would amount to $74 
million by the end of 2030 and $194 million by the end of 2035. 
 
Table 2: Alternative Projected Cumulative Social Benefits with ESA in Texas 
 
 2025 2030 2035 
Cumulative Persisting Participants 118,800 360,103 529,080 
Δ Felonies  314 3,329 8,962 
Social Benefits from Reduced Felonies (Millions) $9 $95 $255 
Δ Misdemeanors 435 4,607 12,401 
Social Benefits from Reduced Misdemeanors (Millions) $1 $8 $22 
Δ Felonies and Misdemeanors 749 7,936 21,364 
Total Social Benefits (Millions) $10 $103 $277 
 
Alternative Estimates 
The previously discussed results all rely on extremely conservative assumptions about the 
social costs of crimes and the enrollment growth rate. Table 2 illustrates our overall results which 
may rely on more realistic assumptions. To be more aligned with the previous literature, we 
assume the average cost of a felony to be $28,500 and the average cost of a misdemeanor to be 
$1,750. Additionally, we assume that the annual growth in school enrollment is equal to Texas’ 
historical average of 1.6 percent. 
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The first cohort of high school students to experience four years of a Texas universal 
ESA program would produce 749 fewer felonies and misdemeanors by the time they become 22 
years old, resulting in about $10 million in benefits to society by 2025. The cumulative social 
benefits would amount to $103 million by the end of 2030 and $277 million by the end of 2035. 
 
Conclusions and Policy Recommendations 
Our results indicate that enacting a universally available Education Savings Account 
program in Texas could have large benefits tied to crime reduction. Like all policy forecasts, 
ours is based on some assumptions. We assume that the percentage point reductions in criminal 
activity that result from this program will mirror those found for the voucher program in 
Milwaukee. We also assume that the estimates for the social costs of criminal activity by 
McCollister, French, and Fang (2010) and Levine and Siegel (2011) are accurate. Although we 
see no reason to doubt these assumptions, we make several attempts to mitigate their impact. We 
report 95 percent confidence intervals of our results to provide a range of possible outcomes and 
use conservative estimates for several important variables. While the public school enrollment 
has been increasing by about 1.6 percent each year, we assume a growth rate of only 1 percent. 
Even though the program would be universal, we assume a slow growth rate in student 
participation each year. We also use a much lower estimate of the social cost of a felony than the 
literature suggests and assume that each criminal only commits a total of one crime. 
Our best, conservative estimate is that the state of Texas would save $194 million in 
social costs by 2035 due to the crime-reducing effects of a universal ESA program launched in 
2017. As the saying goes, “crime doesn’t pay,” but preventing crime through school choice 
clearly would pay off for Texans. 
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We use data from table 203.20 from the Digest of Education Statistics in order to 
estimate the current fall 2017 student enrollment in Texas.3 We use a conservative student 
growth estimate of 1 percent per year to forecast elementary and secondary public school student 
enrollment in Texas from 2018 to 2027. Actual elementary and secondary public school student 
enrollment grew at a rate of 1.6 percent per year from the fall of 2008 to the fall of 2013. 
To estimate the number of overall program participants in a given year, i, who will 
participate in the choice program throughout high school, we use the following formula: 
RelevantParticipantsi = PublicEnrolli*ParticipationRatei*0.44 
 
Where PublicEnrolli is the total number of students enrolled in public schools in Texas in 
year i and ParticipationRatei is the percent of public school students who choose to participate in 
the ESA program. We assume that 5 and 10 percent of public school students will participate in 
the program in years one and two, respectively. Both the DC Opportunity Scholarship Program 
and the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program experienced such participation rates when the DC 
program was launched in 2004-05 and when the Milwaukee program was expanded to include 
religious schools in 1998-99 (Wolf et al., 2008; Wolf, 2012). We assume a steady growth in the 
participation rate of one percentage point for each additional year of the program after year two. 
Since the results of our prior study apply to the students who remained in the choice 
program throughout high school (44 percent of the students), we multiply the product of the first 
two variables by 44 percent. By doing this, we are making the conservative assumption that the 
other 56 percent of students who leave the choice program prior to graduation will experience no 
program effect on their propensity to commit crimes. 
                                                
3 Institute of Education Statistics, National Center for Education Statistics. 2016. "Table 203.20. 
Enrollment in public elementary and secondary schools, by region, state, and jurisdiction: Selected years, 
fall 1990 through fall 2025." Accessed August 2016. 
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To estimate the expected crime reduction from 2017 to a given time period, i, we use: 
CrimeReductionij = TotalPersist*CrimeChangej 
 
Where the outcome of interest, CrimeReduction, is the number of crimes reduced for all students 
who participated in the program continuously from the year 2017 to the future year, i, for a given 
type of crime, j. This reduction amount is calculated for felonies and misdemeanors separately in 
our analysis. The variable, TotalPersist, is the total number of students who persisted through the 
ESA program for at least four years and had turned at least 22 years old by year i. This allows us 
to report results for all of the persisting students who were previously enrolled in the program, 
who have exited the program as adults. The last variable, CrimeChange, is the percentage point 
reduction in the likelihood that a given student will commit a certain type of crime, j. Since we 
assume that the percentage point reductions in Texas will be equal to the reductions in 
Milwaukee, this variable takes on the value 3.44 percentage points (79 percent) for felonies and 
4.76 percentage points (66 percent) for misdemeanors. 
To estimate the reduction in social costs tied to the reduction in felonies and 
misdemeanors, we use the following formula: 
SocialCostReductionij = CrimeReductioni*CrimeCostj 
 
Where the dependent variable of interest, SocialCostReduction, is the total reduction in social 
costs up until a given year, i, that are related to a given type of crime, j.  CrimeCost is the 
monetary estimation of the average social cost of the two different types of crime, j.   
We use the results from McCollister, French, and Fang (2010) in order to estimate the 
average social cost of a single felony in our sample.  If we exclude their estimates for the top two 
harmful types of felonies (murder and sexual assault), the average felony is still estimated to be 
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about $28,500.  We choose to use a more conservative estimate of $20,000, which is about 30 
percent lower. 
In order to estimate the average social cost of a single misdemeanor in our sample, we 
use results from a report issued by the Police Reform Organizing Project (PROP) which states 
that each misdemeanor, on average, costs society about $1,800.  Instead, we use a slightly lower 
estimate of $1,700.  We should note that these social costs are for a single felony or 
misdemeanor.   
Our analysis uses estimates based on reduction in the likelihood that students will commit 
any felonies or misdemeanors.  We assume that the students who will commit any felonies or 
misdemeanors will only commit one.  Since it is likely that at least some of these students will 
commit two or more crimes, our social cost estimates may be a lower bound of the true impact. 
 
 
 
